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POLITICAL SCIENCE

The Child-Benefit Theory:
A Method of Circumventing The Wall of Separation Doctrine
THOMAS L. PAHL
College of St. Thomas, St. Paul
This paper examines two concepts in American constitutional history: the child-benefit theory and the doctrine
of separation of church and state. Both concepts concern
the position of the private school in American society.
Neither expression is found in the original Constitution
nor in any of its twenty-three amendments. Nowhere in
that august document are found the following words:
schools, educations, federal aid, compulsory education,
textbooks, transportation, etc. Thus the present controversy concerning education bas been caused by an omission, intended or otherwise, on the part of the framers
of the Constitution and has been developed due to judicial interpretation. Here, as in so many other areas,
judges have made the law. That the judges were only
slightly more careful than those ignoring the question
brings the student of constitutional law to the position of
not knowing exactly what the judge-made law is today,
and what it will be tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.
Judicial activism seems necessary if the muddy waters
are to be cleared, but the loss of one of the concepts appears inevitable if activism is carried to an extreme. Perhaps clarification less drastic but equally clear can be
effected by piecemeal judicial interpretation. After all,
this is how the confusion began in the first place. Thus it
is best to begin with our silent Constitution and trace its
metamorphosis to the present state in which we have conflicting concepts with apparent circumvention of one concept by the use of the other.
The original Constitution of the United States did not
mention separation of church and state; however, religion
was mentioned in the First Amendment and liberty was
mentioned in the Fourteenth Amendment. Both of these,
as will be shown, came to have special meaning as to
education; and the concept of separation of church and
state has been contained within this meaning. Neither is
the phrase child-benefit found in the Constitution, although it was read into Article One of the Constitution
as part of the general welfare clause. Before facing the
problem directly, we shall examine the words 'religion'
and 'liberty' to see how they have evolved to mean elimii,ation of church schools from state benefits and how
general welfare has come to mean child-benefit.
Originally the First Amendment to the Constitution
pertained not to the state governments but only to the
federal government. Congress has never been directly accused before the Supreme Court of establishing a religion
and has been accused of preventing the free exercise of
religion only in the 1879 case, Reynolds v. U.S., in which
the right of Congress to forbid polygamy in the territories
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was sustained. Far more important than the immediate
effect of discouraging polygamy, at least to monogamous
non-Mormons, was the use of a figure of speech by
Chief Justice Waite in the Supreme Court's opinion. This
figure of speech was used seventy-seven years earlier by
Thomas Jefferson in a letter which he wrote to a group
of Baptists in Danbury, Connecticut. Jefferson, in the
letter, said:
"Believing with you that religion is a matter which
lies between man and his God, that he owes account to
none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative
powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of
the whole American people which declared that their
legislature should make no law representing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,
thus building a wall of separation between Church and
State" (Padover 1943:518-519).
Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the religion clause of the First Amendment and thus this
'wall of separation' did not apply to state action, the
Supreme Court having ruled that:
"The Constitution makes no provision for protecting
the citizens of the prospective States in their religious liberties; that is left to the state constitutions and laws; nor
is there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the
United States in this respect on the States" Permoli v.
New Orleans, 5 Howard 589 ( 1845).
The Fourteenth Amendment was first proposed 16
June 1866, and was ratified slightly more than two years
later on 28 July, 1868. The Amendment was an antebellum attempt to define the position of the Negroes of
the Southern states by granting to them citizenship; and
through its first clause the federal courts have gained the
power to oversee state violation of fundamental liberties
such as freedom of speech, press, religion, etc. The word
'liberty' has come to include education through interpretation by the Supreme Court.
In 1919 Nebraska passed a statute which prohibited
the teaching of any subject in any language other than
English. The avowed purpose of the statute was to make
English the mother tongue of all children reared in the
state of Nebraska and to teach them to think in English
so that they would not imbibe the foreign ideas and sentiments of their parents. A Mr. Meyer taught in a Lutheran parochial school and used a German Bible History as a text for reading, the teaching thus serving a
double purpose: teaching the German language and giv167

ing religious instruction. In the resulting Supreme Court
case, the Court held that the statute unreasonably infringed upon both the liberty to teach and the liberty of
parents to secure instructions for their children in a language other than English, both liberties being among
those protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice McReynolds' opinion stated:
" Plaintiff's right ... to teach and the right of parents
to engage him so to instruct their children, we think are
within the liberty of the Amendment Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).

schools, were the beneficiaries of the appropriations. The
United States Supreme Court upheld the decision of the
Louisiana court and then said:
" ... we cannot doubt that the taxing power of the state
is exerted for a public purpose. The legislation does not
segregate private schools, or their pupils as its beneficiaries or attempt to interfere with any matters of exclusively
private concern. Its interest is education, broadly its
method, comprehensive. Individual interests are aided
only as the common interest is safeguarded" (Cochrane
v. La. State Brd. of Ed., 281 U.S. 370 (1929).

The Meyer case was the first time in the history of the
Supreme Court in which the parental right to educate was
associated even obliquely with religious freedom.
In November, 1922, the state of Oregon passed a
Compulsory Education Act requiring every child from
the age of eight to the age of sixteen to attend public
schools and, in effect, practically forbade their attending private schools. Parents or guardians who refused
would be guilty of a misdemeanor. The Society of the
Holy Names of Jesus and Mary conducted a group of
private schools according to the tenets of the Roman
Catholic Church. They brought suit challenging that the
statute conflicted with the rights of parents to choose
schools where their children would receive appropriate
moral artd religious training, and the right of schools and
teachers to engage in a useful business or profession.
Justice McReynolds used the doctrine of the Meyer case
to support the Court's unanimous decision, pointing out
that:
"The child is not the mere creature of the state; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations" Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925).

Thus for the first time in history the Supreme Court
accepted the child-benefit theory.
Thirty-seven years after Cochrane the child-benefit
theory again reached the Supreme Court. Ewing Township in New Jersey had no public high schools; and its
pupils attended high schools in Trenton and Pennington,
New Jersey, to which they were conducted by bus. Everson, a taxpayer, challenged the right of the school board
to reimburse parents of parochial school students for
money expended by them for bus transportation of their
children on regular busses operated by the public transportation system. He contended that the statute authorizing reimbursement violated the First Amendment in constituting support of a religion by a state and violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by authorizing a state to take by
taxation the private property of some and bestow it upon
others to be used by them for their own private purposes.
After reviewing the previous cases by which the prohibitions of the First Amendment were made applicable
by the Fourteenth to state action abridging religious freedom, Justice Hugo Black said that, in the Court's opinion,
there was every reason to give the same application and
broad interpretation to the establishment of religion
clause. He then defined the clause as meaning ( 1 ) that
neither a state nor the federal government can set up a
church and neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another; (2)
that neither a state nor the federal government can force
or influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will, or force him to profess a belief
in any religion; (3) that no tax in any amount can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions
whatever they may be called or whatever form they may
adopt or practice religion. He then quoted Jefferson's
wall of separation.
However, Black looks at both sides of the problem and
finds that, although the Amendment forbids the support
of an institution with the tenets of any church, it also
commands that government not hamper its citizens in
the free exercise of their religion; and, as a consequence,
New Jersey could not exclude individual Catholics or the
members of any other faith because of their faith or lack
of it from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation. He states further that it is obviously not the purpose
of the First Amendment to make it difficult for religious
schools to operate. Justice Black notes:
"State power is no more to be used so as to handicap
religions than it is to favor them ... The State contrib-

Thus the Court added the right of parents to establish
private schools and forbade the states to pass legislation
denying attendance at them.
In the cases reviewed thus far, Chief Justice Waite's
use of Jefferson's figure of speech was accepted by the
Court as the intent of the framers of the Constitution.
Waite's precedent remained unchallenged until the last
forty years when new and varied services and benefits
have been offered by the various states to pupils in public and private schools. These include free textbooks,
free bus transportation, free lunches, and free medical
services. Some state courts have argued that these services and benefits aid the child and not the school which
he attends. This has come to be known as the 'childbenefit' theory and is opposed to the theory that to provide these benefits not only violates the constitutional
clauses which forbid the use of public money in aid of
religion or religious education, but also violates Jefferson's wall of separation of church and state.
In the 1920's Louisiana used tax money to furnish
textbooks free to school children of the state regardless
of the school attended. The law was attacked as constituting a taking of private property for a private purpose.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld the law stating
that the school children and the state alone, not the
168
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utes no money to the schools. It does not support them.
Its legislation as applied does no more than provide a
general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and
from accredited schools" (Everson v. Brd. of Ed., 330
U.S. 1 (1947).
The fundamental objection of the minority, Justices
Frankfurter, Jackson, Rutledge, and Burton, was that the
public welfare concept was completely inappropriate to
a determination of the establishment of religion question;
that, whenever legislation in fact aids or promotes religious teaching or observances, it falls within the area forbidden by the establishment clause, notwithstanding that
it might be sustained under the Fourteenth Amendment
if the religious element were absent. For the minority
matters pertaining to religion could never be made a
public purpose; the parochial schools were an integral
part of a religious structure and the transportation an
important element in making the parochial schools effective for their primary purpose, which is the teaching of
religion.
The implementation of the child-benefit theory in the
Cochrane case had provoked only tacit disapproval.
However, when this theory was used in Everson, impassioned objections erupted. P. F. Westbrook in the Michigan Law Review wrote:
"It seems to the writer that substantial and persuasive
arguments support the minority position. No argument
advanced by the majority meets the fundamental objecttion that legislation which in fact aids religion or religious
instruction directly or indirectly, is an establshment of
religion. The public welfare argument, introduced in connection with the non-religious due process question
served but to obscure the underlying issues so clearly
pointed out by Justice Rutledge" (Westbrook 1947:
1018-1 019) .
This paper deals almost entirely with the cases reaching the United States Supreme Court as constitutional
issues under the First or Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. It should be remembered,
however, that most state constitutions have provisions
dealing with this question and generally they are much
more specific in limiting the government than the provisions in the United States Constitution. For example,
nine states have passed laws giving textbook aid to private schools and seven of these have been ruled unconstitutional. Transportation aid has also had mixed results
before state courts. Tuition grants have never been approved, although tax exemptions for money spent on tuition have been approved by several states, including
Minnesota.
This paper has not attempted to cover all cases concerning church-state relations but only those concerned
directly with the child-benefit theory. For a more complete treatment of the broader problem of church-state
relations and the history of this problem, the reader is
referred to two main sources: Church, State and Freedom by Leo Pfeffer and Religion and Education under
the Constitution by James O'Neill. Pfeffer feels that the
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separation aspect should be conceived to be as absolute
as can be achieved whereas O'Neill feels that the freedom aspect should be stressed to its absolute. This paper
takes neither approach. Its approach is similar to that of
Glenn Abernathy in his treatment of another clause of
the First Amendment. Abernathy's viewpoint in The
Right of Assembly and Association is that of a moderate
civil libertarian, rejecting the absolutist approach. He
does not believe that any set of constitutional values can
be automatically placed above all others irrespective of
the particular situation.
The flames of the constitutional issues have been
fanned by those objecting to parochial schools, the constitutional issue being a convenient peg on which to hang
an unspoken prejudice. At the same time proponents of
the child-benefit theory use social justice as their convenient peg. The lack of cogent arguments pro and con
increases the suspicion that many approaches are emotional rather than rational. This observation is applicable
to articles on both sides of the controversy appearing in
the public press as well as in institutional publications.
The Catholic Church will probably continue to fight
for child benefits but when the accompanying governmental control threatens control of their institutions, they
will be forced to refuse government support even though
the individual child may deserve the benefit. Perhaps this
built-in safety valve will prevent child benefits from
becoming support or establishment of religion. However,
most persons involved feel greater assurance can be
found in law than in the discretion of Catholic clergy and
hierarchy. Indeed it is this quest for legal assurance which
has made this question so controversial.
This writer feels that the entire child-benefit controversy is a result of fear on the part of both proponents
and opponents of the welfare legislation. The proponents
fear that neglecting the children in private schools in disbursement of welfare funds will result in an unequal
opportunity for education and health, both opportunities
owed the child by the state. Opponents fear the welfare
given to students of private schools in general, and Catholic schools in particular, is a step toward public support
of religious education and thus constitutes establishment
of a religion. This writer does not believe this an 'eitheror' proposition. Rather the writer feels that before legislation is formulated, both dangers should be considered.
If the community feels that the danger to it brought about
by an established religion in the instant case is greater
than the danger to the community brought about by depriving its children of the means to health and safety,
then the legislation would be unwise. However, if the aid
constitutes less a danger to community life than the lack
of welfare benefits to the community's children, then the
legislation would be wise. The local community thus has
an option and, needless to say, the social, economic, educational, and religious background of the individual community will determine how this option is to be used. This
weighing of dangers is the 'political decision', 'small subvention', 'people's decision', that legal experts discuss.
Until the people make their will known, this writer believes the courts should proceed with caution, particularly
169
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when constitutionality of an act is questioned, and the
courts should be wary of using a figure of speech to undermine an act of the democratic will of the people. It
seems that until the people make their will known otherwise and the judiciary can draw lines with greater confidence, the courts should reject the child-benefit theory
wherever and whenever they feel that First Amendment
restrictions are being circumvented; and the government
is doing in fact what it cannot do in law. If in doing so
judges make law, it is hoped that the results of their pronouncements will clarify the relationship between the
government and the private school, thus bringing about
the greatest benefit possible under our Constitution to
the school child without threatening our separation of
church and state or our right to religiously oriented
schools.
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